智能货币化:LLM 平台的广告与订阅设计
Monetizing Intelligence: Advertising and Subscription Design on LLM Platforms
Yuhang Ji · Fasheng Xu · Tianjun Feng
中文摘要
大型语言模型(LLM)平台引入广告后,需要决定广告收入应支持多大比例的能力,以及消费者为避免广告应支付多少。研究一个垄断平台,其同时选择成本高昂的响应质量、广告强度和订阅价格,因为广告会降低用户价值,而更好的服务又能提高广告收益。研究得到三项发现。第一,当部分广告支持与无广告套餐并存时,广告可以为在纯订阅下无法获得服务的用户提供有用服务。中档套餐较低的有效质量削弱了高级用户可选的替代方案,因此即使无广告服务不变,价格也可能更高。部分完全由广告支持的用户获得效用,而部分广告支持和无广告用户则受损:更广泛的可及性可与效用分化并存。第二,适度限制广告可最大化消费者剩余,既保留支持服务的收入,又限制服务退化。第三,更便宜的算力可提高质量并降低广告强度,但成本足够大幅下降后,广告总收入可能超过初始水平,因为更好的服务提高了剩余广告互动价值。扩展研究显示,广告支持的升级可使各套餐达到相同的能力上限和广告曝光,从而消除差别定价的依据。这些结果使菜单设计成为评估 LLM 广告的核心:影响不限于看到广告的用户,也会延伸至不看广告用户面对的替代方案和价格。
关键要点
- 01研究垄断 LLM 平台如何联合决定响应质量、广告强度与订阅价格。
- 02部分广告支持与无广告套餐并存时,广泛可及性可伴随用户效用分化。
- 03适度广告上限能保留服务资金,同时限制质量退化并最大化消费者剩余。
- 04算力成本大幅下降虽可降低广告强度,却可能因互动价值提高而增加广告总收入。
- 05广告支持升级可消除套餐间能力和广告曝光差异,使差别定价失去依据。
解读
尚无解读。
原始英文摘要
arXiv:2610.32945v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) platforms introducing advertising must decide how much capability ad revenue should fund and what consumers should pay to avoid ads. We study a monopolistic platform that jointly chooses costly response quality, advertising intensity, and subscription prices when advertising reduces user value but better service raises advertising returns. Three findings follow. First, when partly ad-supported and ad-free plans coexist, advertising can finance useful service for consumers who receive none under pure subscription. Lower effective quality in middle plans weakens the alternatives available to premium users, allowing higher prices for unchanged ad-free service. Some fully ad-supported users gain utility, while partly ad-supported and ad-free users lose: broader access can coexist with utility polarization. Second, an intermediate advertising cap can maximize consumer surplus by preserving some revenue that finances service while limiting degradation. Third, cheaper compute can raise quality and reduce ad intensity, yet sufficiently large cost reductions can increase aggregate advertising revenue above its initial level because better service raises the value of the remaining advertised interactions. An extension shows how advertising-funded upgrades can bring plans to the same maximum capability and advertising exposure, eliminating the basis for different prices. These results make menu design central to evaluating LLM advertising: the consequences extend beyond users who see ads to the alternatives and prices faced by those who do not.