TRACE-5G:面向5G用户设备的信任感知运行时证明与持续执行
TRACE-5G: Trust-Aware Runtime Attestation and Continuous Enforcement for 5G User Equipment
Al Nahian Bin Emran · Rajendra Paudyal · Rajendra Upadhyay · Arupjyoti Bhuyan · Duminda Wijesekera
中文摘要
标准5G认证与密钥协商协议(5G-AKA)认证用户凭证,但不验证用户设备(UE)的完整性。现有文献包括准入时的设备证书认证和基于可信平台模块(TPM)的度量启动证明,可额外验证UE出示已注册设备凭证并启动到批准状态。然而,这些检查无法揭示准入后是否执行有害未授权软件。TRACE-5G持续验证UE的运行时软件状态,并利用所得信任状态控制网络访问。TRACE-5G保留准入前证书与启动检查,并在运行时完整性验证期间将已准入UE置于受限连接。Linux完整性度量架构(IMA)记录运行时软件度量,TPM PCR(平台配置寄存器)对其进行密码学累积,远程证明框架Keylime反复依据已注册参考评估TPM与IMA证据。Trusted结果在现有PDU会话上授予完全访问,而Untrusted结果则保留或移除完全访问并触发网络去注册。TRACE-5G在srsRAN/Open5GS测试床上实现,使用硬件TPM2.0 UE和核心侧防火墙执行。在十次可信试验中,Level 2访问在9--12秒内建立。在十次不可信试验中,升级被一致拒绝;在代表性轨迹中,限制策略在Untrusted决策后5毫秒内应用,UE上下文释放在1.670秒内完成。TRACE-5G在不修改标准化5G协议的情况下将UE信任扩展到准入之后。
关键要点
- 015G-AKA仅认证凭证,不验证UE运行时完整性,准入后恶意软件执行无法被发现。
- 02结合IMA度量、TPM PCR累积与Keylime远程证明,持续评估UE运行时软件状态。
- 03Trusted授予完全访问,Untrusted保留或移除访问并触发去注册,无需修改5G标准协议。
- 04srsRAN/Open5GS测试床上,可信试验9--12秒建立Level 2访问,不可信决策后5毫秒内应用限制策略。
解读
尚无解读。
原始英文摘要
arXiv:2611.25272v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The standard 5G Authentication and Key Agreement protocol (5G-AKA) authenticates subscriber credentials but does not verify the integrity of user equipment (UE). Existing literature includes admission-time device-certificate authentication and Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-based measured-boot attestation, which can additionally verify that the UE presents enrolled device credentials and boots into an approved state. However, these checks do not reveal whether harmful unauthorized software is executed after admission. We present TRACE-5G, which continuously verifies the UE's runtime software state and uses the resulting trust state to control network access. TRACE-5G retains the pre-admission certificate and boot checks, and in addition places the admitted UE in restricted connectivity while runtime integrity is verified. Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) records runtime software measurements, TPM PCR (Platform Configuration Register) cryptographically accumulates them, and Keylime, a remote-attestation framework, repeatedly evaluates TPM and IMA evidence against enrolled references. A Trusted result grants full access on the existing PDU session, but an Untrusted result withholds or removes full access and causes network deregistration. We implement TRACE-5G on an srsRAN/Open5GS testbed with a hardware TPM2.0 UE and core-side firewall enforcement. Across ten trusted trials, Level 2 access was established in 9--12s. Across ten untrusted trials, promotion was consistently withheld; in a representative trace, restrictive policy was applied within 5ms of the Untrusted decision and UE-context release completed within 1.670s. TRACE-5G extends UE trust beyond admission without any modification of the standardized 5G protocols.